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• > Batson Symposium

Batson Symposium - Oct. 20-21

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Batson at Twenty-Five: Perspectives on the Landmark, Reflections on Its Legacy

In 1986, the Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling in Batson v. Kentucky.  The Court held that racially discriminatory peremptory jury challenges by prosecutors violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that a defendant could succeed with an equal protection challenge to the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes based on the facts of his or her case alone.  Significantly, the Court ruled that the Constitution forbade strikes based on race or on race-based assumptions about jurors—for example, on assumptions that members of a particular racial group will be biased in favor of members of their own race or against members of another race.  The Court also prescribed a three-stage doctrinal framework for assessing claims that the prosecution has discriminated on racial grounds: the decision whether the facts establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional discrimination; rebuttal of the prima facie case by the prosecution; and the trial judge’s determination of whether the defendant has carried the burden of proving intentional discrimination.

Batson celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary in April of 2011.  In the quarter century since the decision was announced, the Court has handed down a number of opinions that have developed the doctrine further—some of them expansive, others restrictive.  The Court has ruled, for example, that white defendants may bring claims that the prosecution discriminated against black jurors, that parties in civil cases violate equal protection when they strike jurors on racial grounds, that Batson’s equal protection constraints also govern peremptory strikes by counsel for criminal defendants, and that sex-based peremptories are also forbidden by the Constitution.  On the other hand, the Court has concluded that it is possible for a party to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination with an explanation for a peremptory strike that is entirely unrelated to the particular case.  At the second stage of Batson’s doctrinal scheme, the reasons offered need not be persuasive.  The only explanations that cannot suffice are race, race-based assumptions, and mere assertions of good faith or no intention to discriminate.  Some of the Justices’ significant decisions in recent years have involved the application of Batson’s constitutional standards to specific fact situations.

Scholars have long debated the constitutional merits of the holdings in Batson and the evolved Batson doctrine.  Many have questioned Batson’s efficacy, suggesting that it has not proven to be a successful tool for eliminating, or sufficiently reducing, discriminatory exclusion of prospective jurors.  This symposium will present a variety of scholarly perspectives on the significance, appropriateness, implications, and effectiveness of the Batson doctrine.  The symposium papers will later be published in the Iowa Law Review.

This program has been approved for 3.25 hours of CLE credit (Iowa).

Schedule

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